Richard WarnickDeclining Indirect Fire and IED Attacks in Iraq
US commanders in Iraq report that indirect fire (rocket and mortar) attacks and IED attacks are declining from previous levels. In October there were 369 indirect fire attacks, the lowest number since February 2006. IEDs are down to an average 25 per day, the lowest since September 2004. Here are two graphs from a presentation by Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) (PDF):
From the October 30 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) report:
This quarter, the level of indirect fire against the International Zone in Baghdad fell to its lowest level in a year, but there was an increase in attacks on Camp Victory. On September 11, one person was killed, and 11 were wounded in a mortar attack on that military complex, which serves as the headquarters of Multi-National Force-Iraq. On October 11, 2 people were killed, and 40 were injured in another attack on Camp Victory.
In discussing statistics provided by the military, it’s important to remember the common practice of systematically underreporting attacks. In December 2006, the Iraq Study group revealed that indirect fire and IED attacks were not counted unless they produced casualties. This means IEDs, for example, are underreported by a factor of six. However, if you assume that the same methodology has been used consistently (which is not a given), indications of a trend may have emerged.
What’s going on? According to Danger Room’s Noah Schachtman, the Defense Department’s $4 billion-per-year Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO, probably can’t claim much credit. Their technological approach has reduced the lethality of a typical IED, but until recently the vastly increased number of IED attacks meant no reduction in casualties could be achieved.
U.S. commanders cited a spike in the number of ammunition caches that U.S. and coalition forces have found. “The clearing of these caches has helped contribute to the downward trends we are seeing in IED explosions and indirect fire,” Rear Adm. Gregory Smith said.
According to JIEDDO chief retired General Montgomery Meigs, the number caches found – about five per day in September, 2006 – jumped to more than 20 per day in May. After a dip over the early summer, that figure has been steady in recent months, at about 15.
Not mentioned by military or Bush administration spokespeople are two other relevant factors:
- The Mahdi Army declared a unilateral six-month cease fire last August. Moqtada al-Sadr is taking the opportunity to purge disloyal officers and improve his army’s training and discipline. Most indirect fire attacks on Americans came from the Mahdi Army.
- US forces are paying insurgents to stop attacking Americans.* Insurgent leaders have recruited 70,000 fighters, and collect $400 a month for each of them. This force is the nucleus of the “Islamic Army,” which is gearing up to fight the Shiite-led Iraqi government. Most IEDs are the work of Sunni insurgents.
Stephen Biddle, top defense analyst for the Council on Foreign Relations, is just back from his second trip to Iraq this year. Here’s his assessment:
Q: Well what do you attribute this whole change on the ground to? Is this due to what is called “the surge,†or good diplomacy by the U.S. military, or just luck?
A: All of those things have some role but I would put “luck†as probably the biggest.
While happy to claim credit for tactical success, the Bush administration no longer talks about the supposed strategic objective of the so-called “surge.” Remember the 18 benchmarks? Prime Minister Maliki’s shaky regime remains powerless to achieve them.
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*This is a creative and culturally savvy solution to the problem of not having enough troops to fully occupy Iraq. And it reminds me of Paul Newman’s clever lament in Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid (written by William Goldman, 1969). Irritated after being chased by the expensive posse hired by E.H. Harriman of the Southern Pacific Railroad, Butch says, “If he’d just pay me what he’s spending to make me stop robbing him, I’d stop robbing him.”
Recommended reading: Washington Post Series on IEDs
UPDATE: Attacks on the British in the south have declined as well. Maj. Gen. Graham Binns, commander of British forces in Basra Province, told reporters that the presence of British forces in downtown Basra, Iraq’s second-largest city, was the single largest instigator of violence. “We thought, ‘If 90 percent of the violence is directed at us, what would happen if we stepped back?,’†Binns said.
